Guest Column

Rosas: Las Malvinas Son Argentinas Carajo

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Argentina’s President Javier Milei has hardened his stance and rhetoric regarding the Islas Malvinas or, as they are known in Britain, Falkland Islands, describing them as a "sacred cause" and asserting that they will once again become Argentine through diplomatic means.

The origins of the dispute around the sovereignty of the islands between Argentina and the United Kingdom can be trace back to the beginning of the 19th century. When Argentina became an independent state on June 9, 1816, it inherited the territories, and took formal possession in 1820, but in 1833 the United Kingdom took them by force. Argentina maintains that the British action in January 1833—when the warship HMS Clio expelled the local Argentine administration—was an unlawful use of force that violated its territorial integrity. The British Government based its position on the principle of self-determination of the inhabitants of the islands. Since then, Buenos Aires maintains the islands belong to Argentina. 

Argentina’s claim is supported by the Argentine Constitution and by the United Nations (UN), which—since Resolution 2065 (XX) of 1965—has recognized the existence of a sovereignty dispute and has called on both countries to negotiate. Argentina’s passport show a map of the country featuring not only Islas Malvinas, but also the Antarctic peninsula over which Buenos Aires, London and Santiago de Chile have overlapping sovereignty claims. Speaking about the Malvinas dispute, negotiations have not made progress. Sadly, the issue escalated into a disastrous war that confronted the two countries in 1982.

María Cristina Rosas, a professor and researcher in the faculty of political and social sciences at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City.
María Cristina Rosas, a professor and researcher in the faculty of political and social sciences at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City.

In early 1982, the ruling military junta in Argentina—led by Leopoldo Galtieri—faced a severe economic crisis (hyperinflation, recession) and growing social unrest, with mass protests erupting over human rights violations. It is widely believed the military occupation of the islands on April 2, 1982, was used by the regime as a nationalist ploy to consolidate popular support and salvage its eroded political legitimacy. 

The military junta mistakenly believed that the United Kingdom would not send a naval task force more than 8 000 miles away to wage a war, and assumed that the United States would maintain a neutral stance or provide implicit support. 

In Britain, Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister. Her decision to send a naval force to the Malvinas was also the result of the economic and political problems she was facing. The country experienced a severe economic recession, deindustrialization, and a sharp rise in unemployment (exceeding three million people) as a result of her strict monetarist adjustment policies. Opinion polls from late 1981 and early 1982 ranked her as one of the most unpopular prime ministers in modern British history since polling began. Around 48 percent of those surveyed by Gallup considered her the "worst Prime Minister ever", and 54 percent of citizens expressed dissatisfaction with her overall performance. Even within her own party (the Conservative Party), there was strong criticism and pressure from factions that doubted the viability of his leadership ahead of the upcoming elections. The Argentine invasion of the islands on April 2, 1982, and Thatcher’s subsequent decision to dispatch a naval force completely transformed her political landscape, triggering a massive surge in patriotism that sent her popularity soaring. Thus, it worked for Thatcher, not as intended for Galtieri and the military junta.

Although it initially attempted to mediate and maintained a neutral stance, following the failure of negotiations, the United States, at that time governed by Ronald Reagan, imposed economic and military sanctions on Argentina and provided significant logistical, intelligence, and military support to the United Kingdom, a key political ally in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The European Communities condemned the Argentine invasion, supported UN resolutions demanding the withdrawal of troops, and imposed trade and economic sanctions against Argentina. France provided strong political support and intelligence to the British -although secretly provided some military support to Buenos Aires. Chile, a neighboring country, remained openly opposed to Argentina and provided secret, logistical support to the United Kingdom (supplying intelligence, radar, and air bases such as Punta Arenas), driven by the tense territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel and the fear of subsequent military aggression. At the Commonwealth, nations such as Belize, Guyana, and much of the English-speaking Caribbean backed the British position.

Who supported Argentina’s claim? Peru was Argentina’s firmest ally in Latin America. It provided diplomatic support and medical supplies, and sent Mirage combat aircraft, missiles, pilots, and direct military assistance. Brazil provided material support and assistance facilities in the region. Israel covertly supplied approximately one billion dollars' worth of weaponry to the Argentine military junta—including refurbished aircraft, air-to-air missiles, and radar systems (facilitated through third countries such as Peru)—due to geopolitical tensions with the United Kingdom. Mexico maintained an official stance of neutrality for diplomatic and commercial reasons, but expressed solidarity and moral support for Argentina’s claim. It should not be forgotten that Mexico has lost territories to the United States -more than half the territory that inherited from colonial times- and France -the island of Clipperton. El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela lent strong political backing and diplomatic support to Argentina's sovereignty claim or opposed the British military intervention. 

Interesting to know that the military government of Bolivia—led by General Celso Torrelio Villa—officially adopted a stance of diplomatic neutrality to avoid economic reprisals or trade embargoes by Great Britain, upon whose industry the Bolivian mining sector was heavily dependent. Although it did not enter into open warfare, the commander of the Bolivian Air Force, General Natalio Morales Mosquera, publicly offered material, logistical, and infrastructural support to Argentina (similar to the support provided by Peru), including the use of airspace and bases. Units and civilians (an estimated thousands of volunteers) expressed their support for Argentina, and young people of Bolivian origin who were performing military service along the borders also took part in the conflict.

As it is well known, Argentina lost the war. The loss cemented British control over the Falkland Islands, though Argentina has maintained its constitutional and diplomatic claim to the islands. Argentina suffered 649 military deaths, over 1 600 wounded, and more than 11 300 captured (though later repatriated). Many of the soldiers were young, poorly equipped conscripts. The war left a deep psychological and social scar on the nation. Veterans faced high rates of trauma and suicide, and April 2 is now commemorated annually in Argentina as the Day of the Veterans and Fallen of the Malvinas War (Día del Veterano y de los Caídos en la Guerra de las Malvinas), a national holiday.

A positive consequence was that the humiliating defeat discredited the ruling military junta led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, leading to his resignation and accelerating the fall of the regime. This paved the way for the restoration of democracy in Argentina by 1983 under President Raúl Alfonsín, followed by the prosecution of military leaders for human rights abuses. 

The economic consequences of the war were also hard for Argentina. The country accumulated roughly 2 billion in debt payment arrears by the end of the conflict, and the external debt surged dramatically from about 9. 7 billion in 1976 to over 45 billion by 1983. As explained before, the United Kingdom, the European Communities, and the United States imposed trade and financial sanctions, froze Argentine assets (such as actions by the Argentine Central Bank regarding British assets), and cut off export credits and arms sales. Inflation spiraled out of control, leaping from 104 percent in 1981 to 165 percent in 1982 and 344 percent (and later much higher figures) in 1983. The peso underwent massive devaluations as foreign exchange reserves dwindled. 

In time, Britain and Argentina have tried to normalize political and economic relations. After cutting diplomatic ties during the 1982 war, Argentina and the United Kingdom rebuilt their relationship through a series of pragmatic agreements starting in 1989. This diplomatic history has swung between periods of close cooperation and sharp disputes, depending largely on the political leadership in Buenos Aires. In October 1989 both countries formally declared the cessation of hostilities, re-established consular relations, and lifted wartime trade and financial restrictions. Most importantly, they created the "sovereignty umbrella," a diplomatic formula stating that cooperating on practical matters would not alter either nation's legal position on who owns the islands. In February 1990 and building on the first accord, the two countries fully restored diplomatic relations and reopened their embassies. The UK agreed to lift its military protection zone around the islands, and both sides established military confidence-building measures, direct communication lines, and cooperation on fishing. Throughout the 1990s, the sovereignty umbrella allowed both nations to sign several practical bilateral agreements on fisheries and oil and in 1999 an agreement, signed in London restored direct air links between mainland Argentina and the islands via a weekly flight from Chile (making a monthly stop in Río Gallegos). It also allowed Argentine citizens to visit the islands using their Argentine passports, ending a 17-year ban, and cleared the way for Argentina to build a permanent memorial at the Darwin military cemetery.

Yet, between 2003 and 2015 bilateral cooperation between London and Buenos Aires deteriorated significantly during the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Viewing the 1990s agreements as overly favorable to British economic interests, Argentina withdrew from the 1995 oil cooperation declaration in 2007 and suspended participation in the fisheries commission. Also, Argentina passed laws penalizing companies operating in the islands' waters without Argentine permits, restricted shipping access to Argentine ports, and ramped up diplomatic pressure at the United Nations and regional blocs to force sovereignty talks. Even banknotes show the tensions between Argentina and London. The bank notes issued in islas Malvinas show the British sovereign siding with the British naming of the dispute territories: Falkland Islands; whereas the 50 pesos bank note of Argentina reads “Islas Malvinas. Un amor soberano” showing the islands, together with a gaucho holding the flag of the country. These days one may find everywhere in Argentina at bus stops and painted walls on the streets the phrase “las Malvinas son argentinas.”

In 2016 a joint communiqué negotiated by Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Foradori and UK Minister Sir Alan Duncan, aimed to remove obstacles limiting the islands' economic growth, particularly in oil, shipping, and fishing. It also established a second weekly flight to the islands (via Brazil) and launched a major humanitarian project with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to identify the DNA of unknown Argentine soldiers buried at Darwin.

Following a return to power by the Peronist government under President Alberto Fernández, Argentina formally withdrew from the Foradori-Duncan pact in March 2023. Argentine officials labeled the deal harmful to their sovereignty claim and demanded a restart of formal sovereignty negotiations, which the UK rejected. In September 2024 under the presidency of Javier Milei, Argentina and the UK briefly revived practical cooperation. Both governments agreed to resume the weekly São Paulo–Mount Pleasant flight, restart fisheries data sharing, organize new visits for soldiers' next-of-kin, and launch the third phase of the ICRC humanitarian DNA identification project. Yet, despite this initial cooperation, the relationship fractured between 2025 and until now, as commercial development of the Sea Lion oilfield moved forward, leading to renewed Argentine sanctions and legal action at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

This year in September, Argentina’s Javier Milei speaking at the UN General Assembly accused the United Nations of “looking the other way” and being ineffective regarding Argentina’s sovereignty claim, further criticizing the failure to comply with resolutions against unilateral changes. In addition, Milei categorically rejected British and Israeli oil exploration in the North Falkland Basin. He announced sanctions against more than 60 entities and warned that companies operating in the Malvinas under British licenses would not be allowed to do business on the Argentine mainland (for example, in Vaca Muerta). Milei’s Government initiated arbitration against the United Kingdom under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and requested provisional measures from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to halt the exploitation of hydrocarbons. 

More recently in appearances in October and November 2026—such as in Madrid during the Iberoamerican Summit and in statements to the media—Milei reaffirmed that he rules out a military path but promised to maintain constant pressure and said: "We will continue to make things uncomfortable for them [the British] until they return the islands to us," arguing that the United Kingdom is undergoing a process of fiscal and demographic decline.

It is true Milei will be facing presidential elections next year. The popularity and public image of Argentina’s president currently stand at an approval or positive rating of approximately 34 percent to 37 percent domestically, with a disapproval rate hovering between 60 percent and 65 percent, according to recent measurements from 2026. This means that 2 out of 3 Argentine’s do not approve the way Milei runs the country. These numbers are similar to those faced recently by US president Donald Trump during the midterm elections and the results were disastrous for his party. Milei stands for reelection next year, and although the arguments about oil and fisheries exploitation of the British in the Malvinas area are real, Milei knows the issue is of concern for Argentinians who may support the President -or so he wishes- to be reelected in 2027. It is hard to know the effect of “las Malvinas son argentinas carajo” speech in the forthcoming presidential elections in the South American country. But one thing is clear: the claims are far from over.

Editor’s Note: The above guest column was penned by María Cristina Rosas, a professor and researcher in the faculty of political and social sciences at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City. The column appears in The Rio Grande Guardian International News Service with the permission of the author. Rosas can be reached via email at: mcrosas@prodigy.net.mx